Apparently articles about the fag-end of my buy-to-let (BTL) portfolio are very popular. I don’t really understand why. Voyeurism, maybe?

Well, if writing them puts even one potential landlord off from getting into BTL then I’m doing them a service.

If you’re new, you might enjoy my first article in this series, about my formative days as a landlord in the 1990s. Or try the second about my one remaining property in London.

The only other buy-to-let I have left – hopefully, the third is currently sold subject to contract – is a Victorian terrace in a pointless London commuter dormitory town.

It’s a two-up / two-down with a small garden, and, enticingly for this particular street, it has an upstairs’ bathroom.

Finumus’ folly

I bought this house in 2001, for about £60,000. The first tenant paid me about £450 per month rent. So did the second, who moved in during 2004.

That gave me a gross starting yield of about:

• £450*12 = £5,400 = 9%

I took out an 85% mortgage at around 6%, set to track 75bps over the bank base rate for 25 years.

My managing agent also charged me about 10%, leaving me with £4,860 net income annually.

That was set against my annual cost mortgage costs of…

• £60,000*0.85*6% = £3,060

… so after the mortgage I was left with…

• £4,860 – £3,060 = £1,800

…of cash leftover every year to go towards maintenance and repairs and so on, before I’d hit my cashflow breakeven point.

That was was all I needed really, since inflation would increase the rent and capital value over time.

And that’s where the profit comes from – in theory.

Rent reduction

The tenant from 2004 is still there. Which is why – spoiler alert – I’ve not sold the place.

Her initially fixed-term tenancy turned into a ‘periodic rolling tenancy’ after six months. And the rent, apart from one change in 2008, stayed the same until 2019. 

That one change in 2008 was a reduction. The tenant lost her job and couldn’t afford the rent on benefits, so I lowered the rent.

Not by much mind, to £420 pm. It stayed there until 2019.

So no rent increase for 15 years. 

Now on one level you might think that failing to raise the rent for 15 years is a bit of a landlording ‘skills issue’. 

I’m aware that some landlords increase the rent by the maximum they think they can get away with every year. I am not one of those landlords, or at least I’m conditionally not one of those landlords.

The conditions are:

1. I’m not making a cashflow loss
2. You pay your rent on time

My tenant has paid the rent, on time, in full, every month for 20 years. I’m not going to do anything to upset such a tenant, while I can afford to.

I’ve experienced enough of the opposite variety – the tenant that pays no rent at all – thank you very much. 

Near-zero gravity

Even though I was completely negligent in raising the rent for a decade and a half, it didn’t really matter from a cashflow perspective. Because in 2008, the Bank of England cut its base rate to near-zero. And it pretty much left it there until the post-Covid inflation wave.

With a base+75 bps tracker, I was paying only £600-700 per annum on the mortgage for more than a decade.

Yes, like £50 a month.

There was really no need to raise the rent from £420 per month when the mortgage was only costing me £50 a month, was there?

Well…

Costs and consequences

You might think generating some £300 p.m. of cashflow would make this property a compelling investment.

Not so much.

Old housing stock requires a lot of maintenance. There was always something, such as:

• Garden fence blown down in storm (about once a year)
• Garden shed collapses due to rot from the neighbours dumping plant material behind it
• Replace all windows with UPVC double glazing (because she can’t afford to heat the place in winter)
• Get a new front door because the old one is not secure
• Get a new boiler because the old one died
• Replace the electricity consumer unit because it’s not compliant
• Replace the downstairs flooring because a flood caused by a plumping leak 
• Eventually replace washing machines, fridges, and so on

Also – you hear that dripping noise?

It’s surely only the sound of money steadily leaving my bank account, isn’t it?

Ahem.

The mould problem

This property has a small, downstairs ‘lean-to’ utility room and toilet out the back of the kitchen – along with the proper bathroom upstairs.

And the downstairs loo often suffered from mould on the walls.

I would find this out from my agent’s periodic inspection report, not because the tenant complained about it.  I’d then immediately instruct the agent to send someone around to sort it out. I’m not the sort of landlord who wants to be letting sub-standard mouldy accommodation. This is far from my vibe.

Whomever the agent instructed would do something – I’m not sure what, but it cost me a couple of hundred quid anyway – to ‘sort it out’. 

But inevitably on the next inspection report the mould would be back. And we’d go through the same cycle again. 

This is all pretty normal. To be expected. Not a problem.

However the costs increased steadily over time – as you might expect, I guess – from £1-2,000 per annum at the start to a £3,000 run rate now.

Some years it’s a bit more. Some a bit less.

Economies of scale

Compounding this problem, the original letting agent – where I had known the principal – got sold to a larger group. Then that group got sold to an even larger group.

In theory this should have brought economies of scale. But in practice, you can probably guess what happened.

Service quality declined and my costs went up.

Although the core management fee remained the same, lots of other costs started appearing. Periodic inspections that used to be included in the management fee got an explicit charge. And the costs of their ‘independent’ contractors went up by a lot. 

Section 24

Since we’re going chronologically, the government also introduced the Section 24 taxation treatment of interest expenses in 2017, staged over four years.

This made mortgage interest not fully tax-deductible. Essentially it meant that one now got taxed on turnover, not profit.

Since we didn’t really make a profit on this property anyway, we had to start paying a bit of tax on profits that we’d not made.

But with interest rates still very low, this didn’t – yet – make too much difference. 

Banning tenant fees

The straw that finally broke the ‘not increasing the rent’ back was the banning of tenant fees in 2019.

These fees include things like reservation fees, credit reference fees, right-to-rent checks, and inventory fees. The sort of thing that, historically, landlords and agents had tried to stick on tenants at the beginning of a tenancy.

Now you might think these fees would be neither my nor my tenant’s problem, on account of the tenant having been there for 15 years?

I would agree with you. My agent though, not so much.

It decided to replace this revenue by applying a fixed surcharge on every tenancy of £15 per month (+ VAT).

This might not be a big deal if you’re letting somewhere for £2,000 a month. But with our £420 per month, that’s 4.2% of the rent.

I wasn’t happy about this. I even ended up having a chat with the CEO of the new-new merged agent about it. His point was, not completely unreasonably, that I was charging a massively below market rent anyway. There was no reason why I couldn’t just put it up by 5%. 

With Section 24 also biting, I was set to lose about £500 to £1,000 a year on this property.

This is not much for a temporary bump in the cost of doing business, maybe. But the other problem was that house prices had stopped going up. In the absence of capital growth, I need the property to at least wash its face.

The other option, of course, is just evicting the tenant and selling it.

But was I really going to evict a single mother, with two kids in school – a reliable tenant, who has paid their rent on time every month for decades?

Honestly, I’d rather not. 

Such are the unintended consequences of government policies to ‘crack down’ on greedy landlords.  

Raising the rent

And so for the first time in 15 years, and with an immense amount of reluctance, I put the rent up.

Only by 5% mind. The agent feels you can’t really just double the rent to the market rent. You need to do it slowly.

The wisdom of just putting the rent up a little bit every year was starting to make a lot more sense now. In anticipation of interest rates rising at some point – and having crossed the Rubicon – I resolved to increase the rent by 5% a year until we got up to the market level. (The tenant was now in employment). 

Since I’d just put her rent up, I decided to make a concerted effort to sort out the mould problem. And as I was between jobs, I took the time to go over there myself to take a look at it.

I unblocked the drain just outside the toilet in question. I removed a five-foot tree that was growing in the silted-up gutter pipe. Next I did a bit of repointing around the affected area. Then I replaced the tiles on the lean-to roof above. Lastly, on the internal wall, I stripped back all of the paint, all of the blown plaster, and re-plastered and repainted with the most toxic and reassuringly expensive anti-mould paint I could find.

It all took about a week of solid work. But I was quite pleased with the result, optimistic I’d sorted the issue out – at least for a while. 

Of course on the next inspection the mould was back. 

Show me the money

Finally, the post-Covid inflation arrives and I’m putting the rent up by 5% every year. Which for a while is actually a real-terms rent cut.1

But this is fine, just so long as interest rates don’t go up…

…which of course they duly do:

From 2022 then, this investment has been making me a loss – even after I increased the rent.

And while Section 24 hasn’t helped, I would have been in the red anyway, on account of my costs and interest rates climbing:

Thankfully property is not my pension.

Shrug emoji

The zero net cashflow, the tax implications, the capital value of the house itself even, are not particularly large numbers in the overall balance sheet of the Finumus household.

It’s not causing me any great financial distress anyway. Which is fortunate for my tenant, I guess.

It does leave me feeling that providing free housing is not an optimal use of my capital. But here we are.

If things stay this way – they can’t, for reasons I’ll get to below – it would take about another five years of compounding 5% rent increases to get back to this house not losing money. (For what it’s worth, without S24 it would only be two years).

But there are a couple of other worries on the horizon.

The first is that my mortgage comes to the end of its term the year after next. Something will need to be done, likely something fairly binary. Either just paying it off or leveraging it up to the max loan-to-value.

I’m not sure which I should do. At some point I might need capital to fill ISAs. Leveraging up is a way of ensuring I have the capital to hand without evicting the tenant. 

Secondly, there are quite a few policy risks floating about that could make things even worse.

Incoming!

The (hopefully) incoming Labour government will doubtless continue the trend set by the Tories of implementing economically-illiterate anti-landlord – and therefore anti-tenant – policies such as: 

• Rent controls: in which case I’ll need to raise the rent to market levels immediately. 
• Reduced repossession rights: in which case I’d likely have to evict the tenant and sell it.
• Possibly something on Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) or similar. 
• Slightly orthogonally: Labour could re-introduce the Pension Lifetime Allowance (LTA). This would cause me to reduce my pension contributions and raise my marginal tax rate, worsening my Section 24 problem. Though it would also see me retire earlier – which might fix my S24 problem.

None of which will help my tenant, mind you. But people respond to incentives, regardless of how much politicians like to pretend otherwise. 

Cashing up

I’ve only made a few grand from annual cashflow on this investment so far – and even that will soon be wiped out.

But how much capital gain have I made?

Zoopla reckons the house is now worth £210,000. But it has not seen the mould. Let’s conservatively assume the house is worth £180,000 after selling costs.

This would imply I’ve made 200% in 24 years. A pretty underwhelming CAGR of 4.9%.

However £60,000 in 2001 is £109,000 in today’s money. Hence in real terms – that is, after-inflation – the CAGR is only 2.2%.

Oh, we forgot the tax!

If I sold it I’d have to pay 24% capital gains tax.

• That’s £120,000 * 24% = £28,800 tax

So I’d enjoy a post-tax gain of:

• £120,000 – £28,800 = £91,200

(Sadly we have to pay CGT on nominal gains, not real terms ones.)

This all works out at a post-tax, real-terms CAGR of…drum roll… 1.43%.

Now you see why everyone thinks BTL is such a money spinner.

As an aside, these sums also suggests that – based on the Zoopla valuation estimate – the current gross yield is only:

• £6,432 / £210,000 = 3.06%

This at a time when 30-year gilts boast a 4.9% yield-to-maturity.

“MSCI are on the line about the mould again!”

Okay, you could argue that because I used leverage – and the tenant paid my mortgage interest for me – the actual capital invested is the deposit, not the purchase price.

The deposit was:

• 15% * £60,000 = £9,000

In reality there are a few more costs at procurement time – legal fees, new kitchen and so on. Let’s call those £6,000.

So £15,000 capital all-in.

This certainly makes the CAGR look much better. £15,000 in 2001 is £27,000 in today’s money. My £91,200 gain from £27,000 is a 6.7% real terms post-tax gain.

Not bad at all. But not great either, I’d argue.

Even with leverage we’re hardly knocking the covers off compared to the MSCI World index in GBP terms. And the MSCI World never calls to complain about the mould.

Certainly if I had the choice again in 2001 to do this or fill the ISAs (or was it still PEPs then?) it’s not obvious that BTL would have been the trade. Especially given the hassle. And this during a time when house prices were booming, apparently.

What’s more I’m not even sure whether working on the basis of the deposit is an entirely fair comparison.

Leverage increases risks, and I could have ended up underwater. Not something that would have happened in my ISA. [Well… – Editor, with a wry smile. But no, not underwater…] 

Going forward, it’s hard to imagine house prices are going to rise in the next quarter of a century like they did in the last.

So when people ask me what I think about BTL – which weirdly, they do quite a lot – I just tell them not to bother.

Unless perhaps you have a thing for mould.

Follow Finumus on Twitter and read his other articles for Monevator.

1. That is, after-inflation. [↩]

What caught my eye this week.

Every morning at 9.30am in New York, a bell is rung at the famous Stock Exchange to signal the start of trading.

It happens again with a closing bell at 4.30pm – repeating a routine that’s watched by almost nobody in the actual business of investing.

Okay, a few hundred floor traders are prompted to think about which route they’ll take home. A giddy CEO from a biotech wonders if they chose a diverse enough team to join them on the platform for the bell-ringing ‘ceremony’ they coughed up for. A retired dentist in Florida watching CNBC growls as yet another day’s viewing has not revealed what sank her 3M stock.

Elsewhere, data whips around the globe. A high frequency hedge fund manager visiting a server farm coughs politely and suggests her cabling could be at bit closer to the wall. A thousand crypto bros ply their trades, day and night. And a fund manager in Tokyo curses himself for snoozing through his alarm and missing the US close.

Major currencies and bonds can now be traded all day and night from Monday to Friday.

But US equities can only be traded out-of-hours in a half-arsed fashion – via wonderfully-named ‘dark pools’ if you’re an institution, or even the internal markets of certain US retail platforms like Robinhood.

And that isn’t good enough for some people.

Be a part of it

24 Exchange – a startup US trading venue backed by hedge fund manager Steven Cohen – has been looking to take trading 24-hours for years.

Its latest submission is with the regulators. Meanwhile the New York Stock Exchange is polling interested parties about how non-stop weekday trading could work.

The Financial Times notes the survey is being conducted by the New York Exchange’s data analytics team, rather than its management. It seems like a fact-finding foray at this point.

And one can certainly imagine all sorts of technical obstacles – from staffing to liquidity to compliance – that would challenge a stock market rolling along for 120 hours on the trot.

On the other hand, doesn’t it feel sort of odd that we still have set market hours?

The whole show is run by restless machines these days anyway, while cryptocurrencies have given the younger human participants a taste for always-on trading.

Google news stories about the New York poll and you’ll find most of the coverage is from the crypto sites. Not a coincidence.

There’s even an intellectual argument for 24/7 trading.

A stock’s price is supposed to reflect all known information about that company and its future cashflows.

But if an earthquake happens in San Francisco on Monday evening, say, a US company’s price is basically a stab in the dark until Tuesday morning.

Investors who want to react to the news cannot do so – except via overseas proxies, the futures market, or those alternative trading venues I mentioned. All of which have their own issues.

It’s up to you New York, New York

Whether reducing these ‘blind spots’ in pricing overnight – and even, conceivably, at weekends – would produce more accurate prices overall is an open question.

Already out-of-hours markets are bedevilled with illiquidity and glitchy pricing.

Long-time commentator Felix Salmon warns “off-hours markets can be treacherous places for investors” and reckons any 24-hour equity market would be a ‘casino’.

Writing on Axios, Salmon also notes that institutions already do most of their share trading around the market’s open and close, when liquidity is greatest.

So most of them wouldn’t want anything to do with buying Tesla shares at 1am on a Wednesday.

That would make official nighttime trading the domain of retail punters – and of those who’d prey on them.

Which probably wouldn’t end well for the punters.

“As any casino will tell you, risky gambles are more popular at night,” Salmon concludes.

Contrarily, some European insiders are discussing actually reducing trading hours on the continent. European trading hours are currently two hours longer than the six-and-a-half hours seen in the US.

The aim would be to shore up liquidity, rather than spreading it even thinner over a longer trading window.

These little-town blues

Where any of this would leave the poor old London Stock Exchange is anyone’s guess.

For many decades London profited from being in a convenient timezone between Asia and the US continent – as well from its ultra-close proximity to Europe.

Would London have more or less relevance in an always-on trading world?

Or are we anyway on a path to one exchange – in New York, which is already home to around two-thirds of global listed equities by value?

Who knows, but in the meantime the London market’s struggles continue.

This week we saw DarkTrace, Tyman, and Hipgnosis agree to bids from overseas acquirers. The £2bn drug maker Invidior also confirmed previously mooted plans to shift its primary listing to the US.

All in a day’s work for the shrinking LSE.

AJ Bells’ investment director Russ Mould warns the volume of firms being snapped up means “the UK market is experiencing death by a thousand cuts.”

Still, it’s an opportunity to profit if you’re an active investor. At least it is if you can figure out what’s truly cheap and/or potentially attractive, versus what’s a conked-out value trap. (Harder than it looks.)

Needless to say, passive investors owning global trackers can ignore all this noise with a wry shake of their heads – and then continue to go about their business of compounding their long-term gains, regardless of how and when the underlying shares are traded!

Have a great weekend.

[continue reading…]

A new-ish short duration index-linked gilt fund from iShares gives UK investors an easy way to hedge against inflation – without taking on huge interest rate risk.

Now I realise that sounded like “schmargle bargle bumpty tumpty” to some readers.

So today I’ll explain as succinctly as I can why this new iShares fund should be good news for everyday UK investors like us.

/ programming interruption /

Update: 30 April 2024 – Very happy to confirm that this fund IS available to invest in with some major platforms, partly as a result of this article. So you can ignore the ambiguity below. However you may need to ask your own broker to add it to their platform before you can invest in it. Anyway, I’ll update this article to make this all clear when I get some time.

/ back to the show programming /

What’s that you say?

‘Should be’ good news?

Ahem – yes.

Alas there’s a catch. After a Monevator reader comment got us and others excited about this new fund, it transpires the reason we hadn’t heard of it seems to be because it’s institutional-only.

Which means peasants like us can’t get at it.

I say ‘seems to be’ because I haven’t been able to confirm this yet.

Certainly I can’t buy it on any of my platforms. Nor can Monevator contributor Finumus.

What’s more, I asked two brokers early last week whether they could make the fund available – including a giant famed for its supposedly-excellent service – and I’ve yet to hear a definitive answer back.

The signs are not good though.

Either way, I still think it’s worth us sticking our grubby noses up against the glass and gawping at this new model: the iShares Up to 10 Years Index Linked Gilt Index Fund (UK).

That’s because in our lusting over it, we can get a refresher as to why index-linked gilts can be tricky investments, despite their obvious appeal.

Want to go deeper after today’s drive-by? Then click the links throughout to learn more about inflation and index-linked gilts. You’ll surely impress your co-workers, classmates, and Tinder dates.

• See the iShares factsheet for all the pernickety details.

What is duration?

We’ll start with a necessary but quick recap – the meaning of short, long, and duration in bond jargon.

In this context, duration refers to how much a bond price is expected to move as interest rates move.

• High duration bonds (/bond funds) will tend to fall a lot in price when interest rates rise – and vice versa.
• Low duration bonds (/bond funds) mostly shrug and say ‘meh’.

This may appear to be another example of the investing industry taking a perfectly sensible word – duration – and then using it to mean something only its disciples can understand.

However there is an underlying connection here, too.

Because of the mechanics of how bond income is paid out before the capital value of the bond is finally returned, there’s a close correlation between a bond’s stated duration and the length of time the bond has left to run before it matures.

Bonds set to mature ‘shortly’ – typically in the next few years – have a lower duration than bonds with many years left on the clock.

The same applies to bond funds. If they own a lot of short-dated bonds – those maturing soon-ish – they will have a lower duration than funds stuffed with longer-dated bonds.

By the numbers

Duration is expressed in the literature as a number.

For example if a bond’s duration number is 11 then it:

• Loses approximately 11% of its market value for every 1% rise in its yield1
• Gains approximately 11% for every 1% fall in its yield

Again, read our article on duration for a much deeper explanation.

Why is duration so important with index linkers?

All bonds are affected by changes in interest rates. Hence all bonds have a duration metric. They will perform differently in different interest rate movement scenarios.

However index-linked bonds are extra complicated.

That’s because the very reason you’d own linkers is to guard your portfolio against unexpected inflation.

And what happens when we see unexpected inflation?

That’s right, interest rates tend to rise in response. As we all have visceral experience of in recent years.

All bonds with high duration figures will suffer when interest rates rise a lot.

But with normal ‘vanilla’ bonds you might shrug and say, “them’s the breaks, I bought my bonds to guard against low growth / deflationary environments. I can’t expect them to do well when inflation takes off”.

But with linkers you’ll likely feel gutted.

That’s because you bought linkers to hedge your portfolio against unexpectedly high inflation. You got high inflation – and yet your (longer duration) linkers fell in price anyway.

It’s a rip-off! Where’s Martin Lewis when you need him?

Note though you are still getting your inflation protection. It’ll be there in the price return, as per the mechanics of how the linkers’ coupons and repayment amounts are adjusted higher with inflation.

The trouble is with a high duration linker, the impact of rising rates can overwhelm the uprating from inflation, because inflation is leading investors to demand higher yields from bonds, driving down prices.

2022 and all that

It’s easier to appreciate how this can happen now we’ve lived through a definitive example.

The problem we faced in the run-up to the bond rout of 2022 was that real interest rates were very low.

The ‘real yield’ (that is, what was expected after inflation) on some UK linkers was minus 2-3% at one stage.

This meant that even if you held such linkers until they matured, you could expect to earn a negative annual return of minus 2-3%!

That’s dreadful enough. But you might be thinking: “Huh? My longer duration index-linked gilts were down 50% at one point in 2022. That’s much more than a 2-3% decline!”

No doubt. What happened was instead of taking your negative 2-3% lumps for two decades, you got most of them in one whack as rates rose far faster than anyone expected – and bond prices duly sank.

This brought forward the baked-in pain. (And left index-linked gilts on positive real yields again, incidentally.)

Why short duration index-linked gilts?

Exactly why index-linked gilts were ever trading at negative real yields is a question for economists, academics, and fans of the stage illusionist Derren Brown.

I know the conventional explanation, obviously.

Talk to a pension fund manager and she might tell you she had to own index-linked gilts at almost any price, because it best matched the liabilities of her beneficiaries.

Also, maybe it wasn’t actually a given that either interest rates or inflation would go higher in the foreseeable future? Or at least not as savagely as we saw over the past couple of years. They’d stayed ultra-low for a decade after all, confounding many investors’ expectations.

Personally though, I don’t think there was much excuse for buying linkers on negative real yields of -3%.

Yes interest rates were near-zero for years. But this hardly seemed likely to last – uninterrupted – forever.

Hence to me index-linked gilts seemed like a time bomb waiting to explode.

This isn’t hindsight speaking. We alerted Monevator readers about this risk many times, most notably in late 2016. We adjusted our model portfolio allocation accordingly, too.

Thank goodness in retrospect. And yet who knows? Maybe everyone was right in that almost anything could have happened, in other universes?

But then time rolled on. The dice fell as they did in this universe, and we got a crash that perhaps wasn’t quite ordained, but which did seem likely to happen, sooner or later.

DIY dilemmas

Anyway, pension funds and other institutions faced difficult choices in the near-zero interest rate era.

But private investors had an extra problem if they wanted to reduce interest rate risk while also owning index-linked gilts.

That’s because the best way to reduce interest rate risk – while still getting some lovely inflation hedging – from linkers is to own the shorter duration ones.

But not many private investors had the knowledge or nerve to buy individual short duration index-linked gilts in the market.

And unfortunately the only retail-friendly linker funds available were high duration.

For example, from memory the iShares core index linker ETF – ticker: INXG – peaked at a duration in the mid-20s! Talk about an accident waiting to happen.

INXG’s duration has come down a lot – to under 16 – after the big decline over the past two years. It’s still high though, when you remember what it implies about how the price will move with a 1% move in its yield.

With scant UK alternatives, for our Slow & Steady model portfolio my co-blogger The Accumulator chose to reduce duration by taking its bond allocation global.

He plumped for a currency-hedged, shorter duration fund that owns inflation-linked foreign government bonds.

This successfully reduced the S&S’s exposure to interest rate risk, thanks to the new fund’s lower duration.

But it did also mean this part of the portfolio was now hedging more against global inflation, rather than UK inflation. A reasonable proxy, but not ideal.

The iShares Up to 10 Years Index-Linked Gilt Index Fund

Instead we could opt for this new iShares fund next time, if we’re ever faced with the same challenge. (If we can buy it, of course…)

Launched in June 2023, the iShares Up to 10 Years Index-Linked Gilt Index Fund already has more than £700m to its name.

The ongoing charge figure (OCF) is just 0.13%. But the minimum investment size is £100,000. That might seem a dealbreaker – or even proof it’s for institutions only – except that sometimes factsheets quote high minimums but the figures turn out not to apply to retail investors. (I still have hope.)

Here’s the skinny on this short duration index-linked gilt fund, as of my writing:

Source: iShares

Don’t be concerned at the fund’s low number of holdings. Not from a riskiness perspective, anyway.

As the UK government stands behind all gilts, they are all assumed to have the same credit risk – extremely near-zero, because it’s assumed the UK government will never default. Hence you don’t need to diversify gilts like you would individual corporate bonds or equities.

The fund is very new as I say, so we don’t have long-term data. But iShares is a top-tier fund house and we can assume this fund will behave just as you’d expect shorter-term index-linked gilts to act, minus a small drag from fees.

One of these funds is not like the other one

iShares awards its new linker fund a ‘3’ risk level. The risk scale runs from one to seven, where low is less risky.

Its conventional index-linked fund2 – which has a duration of over 18 – has a risk level of ‘6’.

Six is bigger than three. And so again, I don’t see why the short duration index-linked gilt fund shouldn’t be available to common folk like us.

The following graph shows how this lower risk playing out in practice.

The blue line charts the return of the iShares shorter duration linker fund since its launch in June. In yellow we have iShares’ standard longer-duration index-linked fund. Both funds are accumulation class

Note which one gave you the smoother (less risky) ride:

Source: Hargreaves Lansdown

Between October and December 2023, hopes rose that the rapid cooling of inflation would soon lead to much lower interest rates. But as 2024 has developed, markets have tempered their expectations due to somewhat sticky core inflation, especially in the US.

The graph shows how the longer duration linker fund reflects these changes in sentiment. Its value moves roughly 15% between the October 2023 trough to peak rate cut optimism in December. Its returns over this period are not driven much by inflation. Rather the move reflects changing interest rates.

In contrast, the iShares ‘Up To 10 Years’ linker fund is a sedate affair. Its much lower duration means it’s far less affected by changing interest rates.

Note you’re not getting something for nothing here. The real yields on shorter index-linked gilts are much lower than on longer-dated issues – less than 0.25% for linkers with less than five years to run versus a real yield of over 1% if you go 20 years out, according to TradeWeb.

It’s not that one fund is ‘better’ per se than the other fund.

It’s that they are doing different things.

What’s the alternative?

Now we know why owning a short duration index-linked gilt fund could be appealing. But what can we do instead of buying it – since for now it seems we can’t?

Create your own short duration index-linked gilt fund via a linker ladder. Basically DIY your fund but only from shorter duration index-linked gilts up to ten years. We’ve written about how to create a linker ladder [for members]. You can expect a lower yield than with a longer-duration ladder, but less volatility.

Buy a longer duration index-linked gilt fund anyway. As I’ve said, the duration on the standard iShares’ ETF (ticker: INXG) has come down to just below 16. That’s still pretty wild if interest rates move. But (a) it’s lower than it was and (b) interest rates seem more likely to come down than to rise, so it could work in your favour as lower rates would push its price up. Crucially, real yields for index-linked gilts are positive right along the curve now. You’re not being charged a negative return for inflation protection like in 2021.

Invest in a lower duration global inflation linked bond fund that’s hedged back to UK pounds. As noted, this is what The Accumulator did with the Slow & Steady portfolio. Global inflation should roughly proxy UK inflation – though over the short-term especially they could diverge. Hedging protects you from currency risk and lowers volatility, but note currency moves are also a mechanism that corrects for inflation differentials. Which means there are scenarios where you might wish you owned such bonds unhedged.

Buy some US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities. I own a slug of the iShares US TIPS ETF (ticker: ITPS). It’s cheap and the duration is just under 7. My bond allocation is modest and only really there for some peace of mind in a crisis, so I’m happy with (unhedged) US dollar exposure. Often – but not always – the US dollar does well when markets crash.

Increase your cash allocation. I believe cash is the king of asset classes. However it tends to get a bad rap in investment circles. You won’t retire early or rich if you only hold only cash. Strategically though, a chunky allocation to cash provides many benefits, from dampening volatility to dry powder for investing into sexier stuff during a bear market. You can think of cash as a short-term bond with a duration of zero. Allocating to cash therefore pulls down your overall average fixed income duration. Cash earning a decent interest rate can also help you with (imperfect) inflation hedging. You noticed how interest rates rose as inflation spiked over the past two years? Not by enough to match the worst of it, but enough to keep the lights on. (Obviously I’m talking about milder inflationary bursts here, not actual hyperinflation.)

This short duration linker fund should be available to us

When you consider all the bonkers stuff you can buy on your broker’s platform, there is no good reason for this particular fund not to be available to private investors.

I mean, two years ago ‘bonkers stuff’ included a long duration index-linked ETF from iShares that at that time was primed to crash 50% in a year when interest rates rose.

Such interest rate risk is massively lower with iShares’ short duration index-linked gilt fund. True we can also expect a lower return – because its holdings are on lower real yields – but that isn’t a risk, it’s pricing.

Who knows. Perhaps I’ll press ‘Publish’ on this post and immediately receive news from my broker that it has made the fund available. I’ll drop a note into Weekend Reading if so. Subscribe to ensure you get it!

Until then we can only dream of owning such easygoing inflation protection.

(As well as asking ourselves some serious questions about when and why we began dreaming about funds, and whether it’s entirely healthy…)

1. Yield to maturity. You can think of it like the interest rate you’ll get provided you hold the bond to maturity. [↩]
2. Not its longer duration ETF I mentioned earlier, though they’re very similar. [↩]