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10-year retrospective: Factors – the edge case

This post is one of a series looking at returns in the decade after the financial crisis.

Many of the passive investing luminaries such as Bernstein, Swedroe, Ferri, and Hale (though not Bogle or friend of Monevator Lars Kroijer) discuss the higher returns you might be able to garner through exposure to the value and small cap factors.

It’s simple to do these days. You buy your entry ticket (not necessarily a winning one) by concentrating a portion of your portfolio on the bargains (value equities) and minnows (small cap equities) found in most stock markets.

Value and small cap companies are known to be riskier than average. The upside is they’ve historically delivered higher returns, if you’ve been patient and prepared to ride out a decade or more of disappointment.

Well I’ve read the books and I was prepared for disappointment. Which is lucky because that’s exactly what I got.

As usual, Trustnet provides the chart that tells our story1:

Global value and small cap returns 2009 - 2019
Specifically it was the disappointment of my choice – the value factor – represented in the table by the Invesco FTFSE RAFI All-World 3000 ETF (yellow line B).

Value equities have had a bad decade. The RAFI ETF only managed an annualised return of 9.4% versus the MSCI World’s 12.1% (red line C). (See our first article for more on the latter’s stellar run.)

Vanguard’s Global Small Cap Index fund (green line A) wasn’t launched until January 2010, but it’s marginally outperformed the MSCI World since then. At least that supports the possibility that the higher expected returns found in academic theory and the historical record haven’t yet been entirely quashed by the popularity of factor investing.

Of course less than ten years isn’t a very long time, and my books had told me that investments can fail to bear fruit for a decade or two, or even a lifetime. But reading about risk and then experiencing it with your own money is as different to watching someone else getting kicked in the nuts and then having it happen to you.

Rick Ferri warned that factor investing is a lifetime commitment. Jack Bogle warned that the only certainty is the higher fees.

What else can I add? Here’s to not getting kicked in the nuts for the next ten years.

Dividends didn’t really pay dividends

While it was far from the sort of disaster we’ve seen in some previous reviews (*cough* commodities) another strategy that failed to cover itself in glory over the last decade was dividend investing – at least judging by the global dividend tracker available at the time (grey-blue line D).

This might come as a bit of a surprise. Dividend investing was the recipient of a lot of buzz a few years ago, as plummeting bond yields in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis made divi-paying equities a popular alternative for income seekers.

As ever though, there is no free lunch. The danger of a portfolio that concentrates on high dividend equities is that this focus on income payers – often more mature, less growth-y companies – may mean that total returns lag those of the broad market.

And lo, our example high dividend ETF brought in 10.7% annualised versus that 12.1% for MSCI World.

Take it steady,

The Accumulator

We’ll continue to gaze back 10 years to see how several other passive-friendly strategies have fared. Subscribe to get all the posts.

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This post is one of a series looking at returns in the decade after the financial crisis.

The more you tilted towards the UK stock market over the past decade, the more you lagged a globally diversified investor. Not one of our domestic UK funds matched the MSCI World’s 12% return.

Trustnet provides the chart that tells our story1:

UK equity returns 2009 - 2019

Digging deeper, smaller caps outpaced the wider UK market, with iShares MSCI UK Small Cap ETF (cyan line C) on 11% annualised versus its mid cap FTSE 250 cousin (magenta line C) on 10.7%. The large cap dominated FTSE All-Share (orange line E) sloped in with 8.3%. As for the mega cap FTSE 100 fund (dark yellow line F), it brought in just 7.6% annualised.

The results are close between the top two of my selections because holdings in the UK Small Cap ETF overlap significantly with the FTSE 250.

Smaller cap funds earned you at least 2.5% annualised more than the broad UK market over the period, which is significantly more than you’d expect from the small cap premium.

Risk factors can’t always be relied upon to deliver a higher return, of course. The value orientated options disappointed UK focused investors over the past ten years – for instance the high dividend Vanguard UK Equity Income Index fund delivered 7.9% and the Invesco FTSE RAFI UK 100 ETF trailed the pack on 6.7%.

Returns made in Britain

Younger passive investors – or newcomers at any rate – may be bemused to see this quick review of the performance of UK stocks.

True, some model portfolios include an overweight to British equities but this is becoming less fashionable. The trend nowadays is to get all your equity exposure via a single world tracker fund.

It’s worth reflecting though that even ten years ago this thinking – and suitable global tracking products – were far less widespread. A decade ago even The Investor found himself recommending UK-tracking funds as the easiest way for new investors to get started. That wouldn’t be the case today.

Many pundits suggest UK shares are cheap, and that the pound is depressed. They suggest that if and when Brexit is resolved there will be a reversion to the mean.

Maybe, maybe not. Passive investors are best off ignoring such speculation, and sticking to their plan. There’ll surely be plenty of other ways to get your fix of Brexit excitement in the months ahead.

Take it steady,

The Accumulator

We’ll continue to gaze back 10 years to see how several other passive-friendly strategies have fared. Subscribe to get all the posts.

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Weekend reading logo

What caught my eye this week.

I think my favourite Shakespeare play is Coriolanus. It’s certainly not the best Shakespeare play, but it’s shot through with a bitter edge that appeals to my inner cynic.

You can keep your Danish snowflakes, your passive-aggressive wizards, and your talking walls – it’s this Roman riches-to-rags-to-dead-in-a-ditch story of what happens when you court the mob that ticks my boxes.

No, I’m not (yet/only) referring to Brexit.

I’m not even thinking about the Extinction Rebellion protestor who was mildly lynched this week for interrupting a horde of London commuters.

I’m talking about the spectacular fall from grace of formerly famed fund manager Neil Woodford.

Told you so

Now, you might think this would be the perfect opportunity for a passive-championing blog like Monevator to cough politely and say: “Ahem, we told you so.”

And obviously we did.

Not that Woodford would fail, particularly, nobody could know that for sure. But we’ve written many times that you can achieve everything you need to by investing in index funds and getting on with the rest of your life.

Recap: There’s always a few winning fund managers at any one time. Mostly they don’t win forever, and even if they do you’re very unlikely to invest all your money with them throughout. Mathematically you’re better off in index funds.

Or, as The Evidence-based Investor writes:

I don’t mean to sound smug or clever. I had no reason to believe that Woodford would perform quite as badly as he did.

I was just pointing out that the odds were heavily stacked against him beating the market on a cost- and risk-adjusted basis over any meaningful period of time.

And that is all very well.

But ploughing through outraged article after outraged article this week, I started to feel almost sorry for the bloke.

Why oh why did he have to do different?

Woodford’s flagship fund is to be wound down, his second fund frozen, and his company is to be shut down.

Winding up the big Woodford fund wasn’t his choice, but to be honest it’s a bit late for that. His investment trust is trading at a ginormous discount because his reputation is trashed. The man who was lauded by the masses is now feeling their wrath.

They feel like they were scammed, they say. How does Woodford sleep at night? He has his millions, they’ve lost thousands. It’s not fair. They blame the platforms, too. And the media! The same media that now reports on him like he’s been discovered with 40 barrels of nuclear waste in his wine cellar that was only to happy to gush about his new company five years ago.

It might sound like sour grapes, but of course that’s not it. Because we can be sure (can’t we?) that had Woodford lived up to the hype and outperformed the markets by as much as he actually lagged them, then there would have been equal outrage from the same people.

Wouldn’t there?

It’s not right, they’d shout! Woodford’s winning gains came at someone else’s expense! Also he cheated by including all that illiquid and unlisted stuff in his funds – so it wasn’t a fair fight. In fact, they’d like to give their winnings back!

What’s that? You think people wouldn’t have said such things if he’d actually outperformed? You believe the way Scottish Mortgage – the UK’s largest investment trust – is praised for its private equity holdings shows nobody cares as long as you’re winning?1 You think the fact that the masses still invest in open-ended property funds shows they only care about inappropriate investment vehicles if they get bitten on the ass?

Well well, I guess you might be right.

Own it

Look, I agree with UK Value Investor that there are lessons to be learned from the fall of Neil Woodford. When things go this badly wrong, Questions Must Be Asked.

And I don’t enjoy seeing ordinary people lose money. Quite the opposite – I write this blog to try to help ordinary people end up wealthier.

But at the end of the day, the story is pretty simple. People let him do what he wanted – and applauded it – when they believed he could beat the market. As he faltered they began to withdraw their money, and this induced a doom loop that ultimately trashed the wealth of everyone involved.

Woodford certainly cannot escape the lion’s share of the blame – in retrospect at least he created a doomsday device. Full transparency, hot retail money, massive funds under management, Brexit, a contrarian position, and a series of off-piste investments all exploded when they met the catalyst of poor returns.

But people didn’t need to buy into his fund. This shouldn’t come as a newsflash. We’ve been writing about passive investing since 2007.

If you want to fly closer to the sun – if you must try to do better than the market – then sometimes you’re going to get burned. End of.

P.S. So Boris Johnson has negotiated a slightly new withdrawal agreement, giving us a second chance at an orderly escape from the best deal we’ll ever have – the one we’ve already got. Hands up, I didn’t think he’d bother, so some credit is due. But I doubt he’ll get it through Parliament (the FT’s maths suggests he’ll miss by three votes) and I don’t think he’ll mind. A wet sock would jump at the chance of taking on Jeremy Corbyn in a General Election, with or without a dangerously populist rallying cry of Parliament versus the People at its back. Ultra Brexiteers will see another chance for a no-deal Brexit, everyone else will weep into the ballot box. As things stand I believe a super-soft Brexit best reflects the very close 2016 advisory vote, but on balance I also think we’ve all learned enough since then to justify a second chance. Hence I’ll be marching in London on Saturday for a new, informed Referendum. See some of you there!

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  1. I own a few shares in Scottish Mortgage. And before you say anything, I fully agree it’s a more appropriate way to invest in unlisted holdings. But it’s not hard to imagine that if these had failed then people would ask why a mainstream investment trust had put money into such ‘exotic’ fare. []
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10-year retrospective: Commodities – the lost asset class

This post is one of a series looking at returns in the decade after the financial crisis.

Commodities were hot in the early noughties. Prices boomed, they became easily accessible through the invention of Exchange Traded Commodities (ETCs), and the broad commodities story was amazing:

  • Long-term returns approaching equities.
  • Low to zero correlation with equities and bonds.
  • High correlation with unexpected inflation.

That list of selling points made broad commodities the dream diversifier.

Unfortunately it really was a dream, at least so far as the past ten years is concerned. Trustnet provides the chart that tells our story1:

Commodity returns 2009 - 2019
Subsequent research has poured hot and cold hogwash over the claims of equity like returns and reliable inflation hedging from commodities.

Meanwhile anyone living the dream woke up to high volatility and a decade of losing returns: -2% annualised over the last decade, or a -5% real return (see lime line C).

I looked at the ETFS Energy ETC due to its exposure to oil and gas (cyan line B). Oil’s boom during the 1970s was used as evidence that it’s a strong hedge against stagflationary recessions.

The oil price hit nosebleed territory in 2008 and despite the 2009 pullback, the rise of those energy-hungry emerging markets meant the oil price could only go one way, right?

That’s right, it went down. Subsequently the ETFS Energy ETC lost -9.5% annualised (-12.5% real), the worst performer of all in this review.

Goldie lots

Maybe the gold bugs were right along? Physical gold had a tremendous Global Financial Crisis returning 90% between November 2007 and February 2009. Since then it’s brought in a 7% annualised return (4% real).

Not bad for an asset with an expected real return of zero.

Gold is meant to be valuable because of its low correlation with other assets and that bears out in the chart above. Compare the pink line D (gold) with the black line A (MSCI World).

I’ve stayed out of gold in my accumulation years due to its lack of expected return and dividends but there’s a case for it in a deaccumulation portfolio.

Note that in our last 10-year retrospective recap we discussed in some detail getting gold exposure via the gold miners. That’s as opposed to owning the metal itself, which is what we’re talking about here.

Are any readers keeping their faith with broad commodities as an asset class over the next ten years? Let us know in the comments below.

Take it steady,

The Accumulator

We’ll continue to gaze back 10 years to see how several other passive-friendly strategies have fared. Subscribe to get all the posts.

  1. Trustnet provides annualised and cumulative return data for periods of up to 10 years. The results below are quoted in nominal £ returns, with dividends reinvested from 14th September 2009 to 13th September 2019. []
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