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The Investor’s 2020 vision

A vision of the future

Note: What follows contains lots of speculation and fantasy finance. It is not a prediction. It is a reminder to keep our eyes on the horizon.

I had a dream which was not all a dream.
– Lord Byron

So here we are in April 2020. It’s a strange date to type out – it reminds me of when I was both a kid and a bookworm, and so I dreaded the arrival of 1984. For the first two or three months of that year I felt like someone was watching over my shoulder as I wrote the infamous date into my schoolbook each morning.

Now it’s 2020, and I can’t help looking back with 2020 vision.

Bear necessities of an investor’s life

As a Monevator reader, you don’t need me to tell you it’s been another good year for the stock market.

Strange to think that when I started writing this blog back in 2007, the memory of the Dotcom crash and the slump that followed had barely been expunged by a timid march towards the pre-crash highs, before we ran into the sub-prime crisis and another plunge in stock markets around the world.

I used to believe that investors of my generation would one day be grateful for a chance to get into equities at reasonable levels, but I don’t think many of them actually did. Going on Monevator traffic, it wasn’t until 2015 or 2016 that people really started taking an interest in shares in a big way again.

As a still-anonymous blogger – barely – the long years in the wilderness with just a loyal band of readers suited me fine. Having the Daily Mail camped outside my front door in 2018 after Time Warner tried to buy Monevator was infinitely scarier than seeing shares plunge in 2008.

And in case you’re still wondering, no I’m not Richard Branson, King William, Toby Young, Lady Gaga, or that Australian from the old show, Dragon’s Den.

Things could only get better

Anyway, I’m rambling – an increasing foible as you age, they say, but long-suffering readers will know it’s always been my vice!

Back to today’s stock market, and it seems fitting that the FTSE 100 finally broke through the 14,000-barrier this month. Round numbers don’t mean anything to computers, but thanks to behavioural economics we know they have an impact on us sentimental investors.

I’d love to have a time machine to go back to 2009, when other bloggers ridiculed me for writing about the potential for a great decade to come for equities.

Not because I would like to take them an iPad 11 to show them a screenshot of the FTSE 100 at 14,000 – if they ignored the evidence of historical asset class returns in favour of Doomsday scenarios, then I don’t see why they’d listen to a salt-and-pepper haired blogger from the future in a blue jumpsuit.

No, I’d simply use my time machine to go back and invest more money.

Short of borrowing to invest, I threw most of my disposable income towards snapping up equities between 2008 and 2011. Yet who wouldn’t have invested even more knowing what we now know?

Then again, as I say the decent run for shares wasn’t entirely unpredictable.

Short-term returns from equities are fiendishly volatile, as any investors who lived through that grim first decade of the 21st Century will attest. But over the longer-term, it tends to even out.

Indeed, by April 2011, the FTSE 100 had already soared like a phoenix from the flames (or like a bonfire of discarded share certificates heaped and set alight in a dumpster) to break back above 6,000.

14,000 and rising

Now, we know the long run nominal return from UK shares has been about 10%.

As well as inflation, that 10% return includes dividend income. Excluding the latter but not the former, we might have guessed the FTSE 100 would grow at about 7% for the nine years to 2020.

This would have taken the index to 11,000. But remember too that the decade from 2000 to 2010 was one of the worst on record for shares. Things were likely to do better than average, in turn.

True, much of the near-20% returns per annum that optimists predicted for the decade that followed were delivered in the early years of the recovery, as the market roared back from the March 2009 lows.

Yet valuations and sentiment had both become so thoroughly depressed by 2009 that equities have had a decent push beyond their long-run average for most of the past 11 years.

As it turned out, an investor who put £10,000 into the cheapest FTSE 100 index tracker in April 2011 and reinvested all her dividends should now have a nest egg worth approximately £30,000. And if she’d been even braver, and invested in the nadir of 2009, she’d have over £50,000.

Who says optimism never pays?

Bonds a bust, gold got sold

It hasn’t all been plane sailing. While we’ve seen none of the truly horrendous turmoil that scared that earlier generation of investors so silly that for a crazy moment in late 2008 they accepted negative returns on US Treasuries, we have had the usual lurches in confidence – along with the usual background noise of geopolitical posturing.

And needless to say, while equities are the biggest daredevils of any portfolio, they aren’t the only asset class that can give investors the willies.

The great bond rally of 1980 to 2010 finally broke down, for example, to the dismay of those who’d gorged on those 30-year issues that Central Banks pumped out in 2009 and 2010. But at least with bonds you get your money back if you hang around long enough.

Not that anyone seems to want to hold bonds these days. Nor cash, for that matter, despite 7% interest rates. We would have killed for that a decade ago!

Of course, back in April 2011 it was all about gold, which had just hit $1,500 an ounce – roughly where it sits today. Gold bugs were right that the price of gold would go higher, but wrong that we’d all eventually trade in our American Express credit cards for Krugerrands and shotguns. Eventually, gold fell. The yellow metal is a valuable diversifier, but there’s no comparison between backing it or human industry.

The same might be said about oil and the other commodities. Yes, they provided the early juice to the recovery, as countries like China and India took the accelerated steps that turned them into the top-tier powers we know today. But oddly enough, just like the British Empire and the American one that followed, China and India still haven’t consumed every last lump of whatever the Australians can dig up. Our energy use has changed, and we’re also changing how we make things, which ultimately put a lid on price rises.

Just ask anyone who bought into that insane IPO of 2015, which simply proposed an open-ended mandate to begin an “undertaking of great advantage” through mining operations in the last unexplored realm within our reach.

Back to the future

The flotation of Moonshot Mining PLC aside, most of the past decade has been largely free of the bubbles that blighted the previous ten years.

So has humanity finally learned its lesson? Hardly. I’m sure we’ll see bubbles again in my lifetime.

It’s true that 2000 to 2010 did leave a painful memory. But frankly, those same events also left the average Man on the Clapham Hoverbus without much money to pump up a new bubble – especially given the competing need to service those horrendously huge mortgages taken out on UK property as a result of the last one. (Even higher interest rates from 2012 haven’t really dented London property prices. Long-time Monevator readers will know I’m STILL renting as a result!)

Having said all that, there are some signs that shares are now getting frothy.

The rally over the past decade has been broad, with miners eventually giving way to leadership by the global consumer companies that rule our world, and to the eventually rehabilitated banking and housebuilding sector.

But technology shares have arguably become very overvalued, 20 years after the last tech bubble burst.

Also, while I’m his biggest fan, I do wonder whether Warren Buffett can really keep running the very expensive-looking Berkshire Hathaway from a life support machine.

Bond vigilante

Overall the market isn’t expensive, claim my critics, who call me a grizzly old bear. “Britain is booming!” they cry, adding that we can hardly have a recession when so much of what we used to call the emerging world is now living the middle-class dream.

It’s funny how things turn on their head if you wait long enough.

Maybe I am an old fuddy-duddy. From 2008-11 I was happy to run 90% equity exposure: I knew it would hurt me in a dip, but the opportunity was there for the taking and the odds seemed fair. Plus I had a crucial long-term perspective.

Now I’m 50% in cash and bonds, which is much more conservative than my share crazy doctor tells me I need to be. (He’s also more bullish that I’ll eventually reach my centenary, too, but then I can remember when even a 70-year old was considered ancient. Buy more GlaxoSmithKline-Zeneca, I say).

So why the shift in my portfolio? Joking aside, it’s partly an age thing – I’ve ten years fewer left now to ride out the vicissitudes of the stock market.

But there’s also the thorny matter of valuation.

Back in 2011, the FTSE 100 was on a forecast price-to-earnings ratio of roughly 10. The P/E ratio fell to less than 9.5 for 2012. These numbers suggested investors didn’t expect much growth to come.

Fast-forward to 2020, and I’m assured a P/E of 22 reflects the new reality of a world population that’s topped 8 billion hungry souls.

The next bear market

A new reality, eh? Now where have I heard that before?

Personally, I suspect a new bear may finally be preparing to emerge from the history books. Don’t ask me when it will strike – nobody ever knows, and markets can stay irrational far longer than you will want to wait. (Did I mention I’m STILL renting?)

I tell you this though: I am more fearful today given how everyone seems so gung-ho about equities, compared to when none of my friend’s cared less.

What should you do? Some will say stock up on gold and cans of tuna, but of course there’s no tuna left.

Instead I suggest you rebalance your portfolio a shade more conservatively, consider a few alternative assets, and don’t be afraid to hold cash.

I know, I know: you tripled your money by investing in shares over the last decade. But take it from an old codger – the good times won’t last forever.

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The sleepy backwater of passive investing has been rudely disturbed by the clanging of alarm bells. The explosive growth in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), especially synthetic ETFs, has been spotlighted as a potential threat to the stability of the global financial system in reports by the G20’s Financial Stability Board (FSB), The International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

The reports warn of a daisy-chain of risks embedded in the design and operation of ETFs. They urge investors, regulators and the ETF industry to take heed.

Having read a flurry of disturbing media articles based on the reports, I dived into the original material hoping to discover the threat had been hyped out of all proportion. Unfortunately not. The FSB talk of “disquieting developments” and the BIS paper draws upon the experience of the sub-prime implosion to warn of the dangers of looking the other way.

There’s a lot to take in, so I will concentrate purely on the potential threats posed by synthetic ETFs (also known as swap-based ETFs) in this article, and deal with physical ETFs later.

What happened to simple ETFs?

Emerging synthetic ETF risks

It’s the runaway success of ETFs that requires the risks to be reassessed. The ETF dream is access to a diversified low-cost portfolio using a simple investment vehicle that can be traded like shares. That’s jacked up global ETF assets under management from $410 billion in 2005 to $1,310 billion in 2010, according to the BIS.

But this rapid rise has fostered innovations like synthetic ETFs that could have unforeseen impacts during times of market turmoil. The reports highlight a number of possible dangers that feed into each other, including:

  • Counterparty risk
  • Collateral risk
  • Liquidity risk
  • Conflicts of interest

Counterparty risk

The most famous example of a counterparty default is Lehman Brothers. In the ETF world, counterparties are most commonly used by synthetic ETFs. Unlike physical ETFs, synthetics don’t use their investors cash to buy the physical underlying assets of the index they track. Instead they buy a total return swap from a counterparty (usually an investment bank) that guarantees to pay the ETF provider the return on the index being tracked.

If the counterparty goes bust then there’s nobody to pay the ETF return. That’s unpleasant but supposedly not disastrous because the counterparty hands over collateral to the ETF that’s meant to cover at least 90% of the ETF’s assets. In an emergency, the ETF provider can sell off the collateral to repay investors.

It’s conflict of interest time again

Unfortunately, all three reports identify potential conflicts of interest in the structure of many synthetic ETFs, to the extent that I’m reminded of playing Jenga on a wobbly kitchen table – in Tokyo.

The problem is that ETF providers and counterparties are often different arms of the same institution – especially in Europe. For example, Db x-tracker ETFs are part of Deutsche Bank and Lyxor ETFs are a chip off the French bank, Société Générale.

The suggestion is that investment banks can save costs in other parts of their business by using ETF collateral baskets as a dumping ground for illiquid, hard-to-sell securities that might otherwise be cluttering up their books. For example, your FTSE 100 ETF might actually be backed by unrated corporate bonds or Japanese small caps.

The FSB suggests that lowering the cost of funding may be the reason why investment banks conjured up synthetic ETFs in the first place:

As there is no requirement for the collateral composition to match the assets of the tracked index, the synthetic ETF creation process may be driven by the possibility for the bank to raise funding against an illiquid portfolio that cannot otherwise be financed in the repo market.

And while that may be good for the banks, it’s not so great for investors in the event of a market crisis.

Collateral risk

Though synthetic ETF assets and investor interests are theoretically covered by collateral, all is not rosy:

  • Illiquid collateral is hard to shift. This could damage the liquidity of ETFs that are forced to sell in order to meet redemptions.
  • The collateral may not adequately cover the ETF’s assets, especially in a falling market.
  • The ETF may not be able to sell pledged collateral, if it is frozen by a bankruptcy administrator when a counterparty fails.

ETFs often maintain collateral worth up to 120% of assets, but as the BIS comments:

Overcollateralisation might provide little comfort, as crisis experience has shown that collateral quality tests and collateral coverage tests designed by rating agencies for structured products did not protect senior tranche holders from losses.

If collateral provides cold comfort and seismic market events heighten the possibility of counterparty default then nervous investors could force a run on synthetic ETFs, as outlined by the BIS:

Patterns of withdrawal from money market funds during the crisis show that institutional investors are likely to be the first to run when markets question the solvency of a fund provider, which can then trigger a broader run on the industry.

Liquidity risk

If the ETF provider faces a tidal wave of redemptions requiring cash to be returned to investors, then a mechanism that has previously been a font of cheap funding could become a strain, in the view of the BIS:

Sudden and large investor withdrawals triggered by market events or counterparty risk concerns can also lead to funding liquidity risk. This risk can propagate through the investment banking function, which might take for granted the access to cheap funding through the swap arrangement with the ETF sponsor.

The evaporation of funds, compounded by congealing collateral, could also compromise the ETF provider’s ability to maintain the market liquidity of synthetic ETFs, according to the FSB:

In case of unexpected liquidity demand from ETF investors, the provider might face difficulties liquidating the collateral and may be faced with the difficult choice of either suspending redemptions or maintaining them and facing a liquidity shortfall at the bank level.

Funding stress at the bank – in the teeth of extreme market conditions – would surely heighten fears of counterparty risk. As the FSB puts it:

Since the swap counterparty is typically the bank also acting as ETF provider, investors may be exposed if the bank defaults. Therefore, problems at those banks that are most active in swap-based ETFs may constitute a powerful source of contagion and systemic risk.

Moreover, the other option of suspending redemptions could have knock on effects for the market-makers who match buyers with sellers on the exchange, adding to the turmoil. The BIS paints the picture:

Because ETF redemptions will require cash to be delivered against collateral assets that might be illiquid, market-making activities could be severely hampered, as funding these assets might take priority. The collapse of funding for individual financial intermediaries could then reinforce funding stresses for the financial system as a whole.

Run for the hills?

Added together it’s enough to make my primal-self want to split my money between the mattress and a hole in the ground. However, all three reports are careful to point out that they’re highlighting potential risks, not an imminent doomsday scenario.

The ETF industry is already responding with talk of how robust their operations are and claiming that the theorised collision of calamities is the kind of black swan that won’t fly.

Still, few saw sub-prime coming either and no doubt that’s contributing to greater regulator vigilance this time.

There’s plenty more in the reports if you fancy a bigger dose of the willies. Warnings about the complexity of leveraged and inverse ETFs, the impact of ETFs and ETCs on their underlying markets… and there’s no need to look smug if you only hold physical ETFs. Security lending programmes leave them exposed to collateral and counterparty risk, too.

I’m not advocating consigning synthetic ETFs to a toxic tank that’s already full of endowment mortgages and split zeroes. We need to see how this one plays out.

But rest assured I’ll be keeping an eagle eye on synthetic ETF risks in the future.

Take it steady,

The Accumulator

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Weekend reading: The Economist does pensions

Weekend reading

Some great reads from around the Web.

Hello? Hello? It’s hard to be sure anyone is reading out there, given how the first four-day Brucie Bonus bank holiday of the year has coincided with – well – summer.

London has gone all Club Med, and even I feel like some ascetic monk, sat writing this on a Saturday morning while the sun blazes outside.

But YOU have come to Monevator (or opened your email) despite the competing attractions of burnt Tesco Finest sausages, traffic jams, and ogling the opposite sex in the park, for which I thank you.

Then again, maybe you’re reading on Tuesday.

Either way, the slight swizz is that my post of the week is actually from two week’s ago, when a fabulously detailed special report on pensions popped up at The Economist. But I missed it, and you shouldn’t.

This opening fact sets the tone:

When Gertrude Janeway died in 2003, she was still getting a monthly cheque for $70 from the Veterans Administration—for a military pension earned by her late husband, John, on the Union side of the American civil war that ended in 1865.

The pair had married in 1927, when he was 81 and she was 18. The amount may have been modest but the entitlement spanned three centuries, illustrating just how long pension commitments can last.

And so the gravity of the situation pulls us in:

  • We discover that a couple receiving the maximum US social security entitlement would need a $1.2 million fund to buy the equivalent annuity.
  • We learn that the first person to receive such a payment had only contributed $24.75, yet she withdrew nearly $23,000 and lived until 100.
  • We see how UK life expectancy has risen nearly 18 years, but our once-glorious pension system hasn’t kept up (not least thanks to a certain G. Brown’s dividend raid…)

Make sure you follow the links in the sidebar towards the top of The Economist’s introduction to see all the issues this huge report explores.

[continue reading…]

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An update on 2007’s high yield portfolio

The ups and downs of the high yield portfolio reviewed

Back in the day, before the credit crunch – before our most precocious readers were even born – I wrote a series of posts on income investing via a high yield portfolio (HYP) of shares.

I think now may be an opportune moment to create a new HYP for dividend income, and I’ll do so in an upcoming post.

But it seems only right that we first go kick the tyres of the original, four years on.

There were several parts to my HYP series:

  • Grow your income with dividends from high yield shares: HYP Part 1
  • Choosing a good high yield share for the long haul: HYP Part 2
  • Diversifying your portfolio: HYP Part 3
  • Selecting shares for your high yield portfolio: HYP Part 4

The article sequence ended with an example high yield share portfolio in Part 4, which was published on September 26th 2007. (Parts 5 and 6 have still not been completed. Blame the distracting financial crisis!)

Unfortunately I’ve discovered that the table of final picks embedded in Part 4 has been corrupted, and no longer displays. But you can still see the constituents of the portfolio in an update from February 2009.

That update, and the one I’m about to conduct today, suffers from the fact that I haven’t considered income, only the capital value of the shares.

You may argue that reviewing an income portfolio without taking into account income is like reporting from Wimbledon after all the players have gone home. I wouldn’t disagree. Income portfolios are constructed primarily for income, not for capital gain. The latter is left to fend for itself, which should hopefully happen with a well-chosen equity income portfolio, as a rising dividend stream will sooner or later mean rising share prices.

The trouble is when I picked my original demo portfolio, I didn’t consider posterity, and so it wasn’t set up for tracking.

Now, I could spend a few hours retrospectively rebuilding the portfolio with 2007 prices, allocate it say £100,000 of pretend money, and then manually calculate the income due in 2008, 2009, 2010 and in the year to come but, well, I’m still single and I’m not getting any younger.

If anyone out there has some spare time and would like to do so and report back in the comments below, I’m sure we’d all be very grateful!

The 2007 HYP and the subsequent bear market

Having explained (though not excused!) the lack of income monitoring with this portfolio, let’s turn to capital.

The idea, rightly or wrongly, was to buy a portfolio of blue chip shares and hold them for the long-term. For the full selection criteria, please see the posts linked to above.

The strategy in short: I selected 20 shares from the upper reaches of the index primarily by yield, looked for diversification between industry sectors, then ditched and replaced companies I didn’t like the look of for some reason (usually debt).

As we all know with hindsight, September 2007 was around the high water mark for the last stock market bull run. A few weeks later the sub-prime doodah hit the fan, making mincemeat of former FTSE darlings, including three constituents of this demo HYP: the bankers at Royal Bank of Scotland, low-end lender Cattles, and housebuilder Taylor Wimpey. Most other shares took a pounding, too.

By the time of my February 2009 update, the demo HYP had fallen in value by 44%. That was worse than the FTSE 100, which had fallen 39% over the same period. (Please read that update for full details).

The 2007 HYP in 2011

So how has the portfolio fared since those dark days of early 2009, which was pretty much the low of the past bear market?

Here’s how things stand as of Friday 15th April’s closing prices:

Company 2007 2011 Change %
A&L (delisted) 733 317 -416 -57%
RBS 517 43 -474 -92%
Tomkins (delisted) 222 325 103 46%
Taylor Wimpey 258 37 -221 -86%
Cattles (delisting) 348 1 -347 -100%
Investec 503 475 -28 -5%
BT Group 305 191 -114 -37%
Hiscox 256 403 147 57%
Royal Sun Alliance 148 133 -15 -10%
Signet Group 1621 2688 1068 66%
Pearson 739 1098 359 49%
National Grid 791 605 -186 -23%
Tate & Lyle 560 607 48 8%
Scottish & Southern Elec. 1510 1318 -192 -13%
InchCape (10:1 share consolidation) 4140 350 -64 -92%
IMI 535 989 454 85%
GlaxoSmithKline 1318 1259 -59 -4%
British American Tobacco 1777 2559 782 44%
BP 567 456 -111 -20%
Unilever 1590 1957 367 23%
Overall
2007 High Yield Portfolio -8%
FTSE 100 6,433 5,996 -7%

Note: All rounded to zero decimal places.

Looking at the portfolio, we see the usual lurches and collapses that happen in any portfolio of individual shares.

Most strikingly, two of the companies are no longer quoted: Alliance and Leicester was acquired by Santander, and Tomkins by a bunch of Canadian pensioners. Furthermore, benighted Cattles is in the process of being taken over, and its suspended listing will soon be wiped away entirely.

Of the remaining shares, the best performer has been IMI, which is 85% higher than in 2007. That’s a huge bounceback from 2009, when it was 48% lower.

InchCape might flatter to deceive if you look at my post from 2007. The share price appears to have advanced handily since then, but in reality the company did a 10-for-one share consolidation in 2010. InchCape almost went bust in 2009, and while management is to be congratulated for avoiding that fate, it’s still smells a bit to hide the body like this.

Overall, we still see the HYP is trailing the market, though only by 1% now as opposed to 5% back in 2009. This may be surprising, given the near blowouts of the likes of Cattles and that our only selection from the booming commodities sector that dominates the FTSE is error prone BP. In my experience it’s not unusual for HYPs, though, probably because the high yield is an indicator of value in some shares, as much as lurking calamity in others. Over time, it evens out.

As for income, the initial yield was almost 4.8% versus less than 3.2% for the FTSE 100, but as warned above I have no numbers on how income has done in practice. The likes of Pearson and Glaxo have kept delivering the dividends, but RBS, BP and Cattles certainly haven’t!

Final thoughts on this portfolio

This is a very rough review. Not only does it ignore income, but I’ve not included other factors such as that you would have reinvested your A&L and Tomkins takeover money back into a rising market.

That might have reduced the performance gap with the FTSE 100 a tad further. In addition, there would have been no charges to pay over the four years of holding the shares, though given the low-cost of the best FTSE 100 index trackers these days, it will have made negligible difference.

More importantly, it’s very possible I’ve missed certain critical facts out from my quick calculations above. I almost missed the InchCape share consolidation, for instance. There could have been others, or on the plus side special dividends.

While you’d have certainly been paying more attention if they were your shares, all this fuss highlights a big advantage of a passive ETF approach to investing. Another alternative is to buy income investment trusts or even white list funds (make sure you go through a discount broker to get initial charges rebated) and to let the managers worry about takeovers and bankruptcies.

But some of us will always actively enjoy owning companies. Also, income trusts are now trading at a premium, which means every £1 you invest buys less than £1 of assets. Not a great deal, considering most are only holding big liquid blue chips.

For that reason and more, I think now might be a good time for share enthusiasts to construct a new high yield portfolio. And I’ll be doing so next week!

As for the 2007 portfolio, this is probably its final public outing. The chances of introducing errors is only going to increase as the years go by, which makes the whole exercise pointless.

If anyone has a favorite online portfolio tool they can recommend for tracking the new HYP over the long-term (one that automatically accumulates dividend income please!) then do let me know below.

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