Question: What’s worse than putting your money into an active fund that charges high fees?
Answer: Putting your money into an active fund that charges high fees, but that to a large extent holds the same shares as its benchmark index.
Such funds are known as closet indexers, and a new report by wealth manager SCM Private claims that the UK is amok with these clone funds, compared to both the US and to investor expectations.
SCM’s research found 40% of the holdings of the average UK fund matched the underlying index, versus 25% in the US:
It says that nearly half of UK equity funds fall into this closet indexing category, compared to just 10% in the US:
Now given that most active funds fail to beat the market, you might cynically think the more of them who copy the index, the better.
But closet indexing is a poor deal for many reasons.
Firstly, if your fund largely mirrors an index, you’ve got even less chance of beating it.1
True, we have abundant evidence that the majority of active funds will fail to beat the market long-term, anyway. But closet indexers are even less likely to outperform. Presumably if you’re putting money into an active fund then that’s what you’re trying to do – so you want to pick a fund with the best shot at doing so.
Secondly, you’re paying a lot of money for less active management than you thought you were getting.
If you’re paying, say, a 2% management fee to a fund manager, but half of the fund is effectively an index tracker, that means at least 1.5% of your fee is effectively paying for the actively managed portion of the fund – which means you’re actually paying 3% for their active efforts! That’s a very high hurdle for their picks to get over every year before they can beat a cheap index tracker.
Thirdly, SCM says there may be miss-selling implications.
I think this is a stretch – if fund managers are allowed to implore you to put your money with them to beat the market even though so few do, it seems anything goes – but in the post-PPI climate, maybe they’re onto something.
Why do closet index trackers exist?
As you might have guessed from my pretty mild outrage, I’m not particularly aghast to learn that so many UK funds are closet index funds.
Perhaps that’s because I’ve known about the tendency for while, or maybe it’s because after so many years of financial scandal and drama, this one seems a village green sort of scam – more Bertie Wooster than Bernie Madoff.
SCM’s boffins worked out that under-performing closet index funds have cost investors £1.9 billion in fees in the past five years, which is admittedly quite a sum. And I do have sympathy for newbies to investing, to whom index tracking seems utterly illogical, whereas paying an expert to manage their money seems most prudent. They are being sold a pup.
But the great mass of the closet indexing money will be in the hands of experienced investors who’ve had plenty of time to wise up. Monevator alone has been making the case for cheap tracker funds for six or seven years!
Indeed, a big reason closet indexing exists is due to the unreasonable demands of investors.
I’m not defending the financial services industry, but it’s worth noting:
Investors are unrealistic. They want market beating funds, but they don’t buy into funds that have had a bad year. Perhaps they even pull their money out of them. This means under-performing the index – even for a short time – is a big risk for the typical fund.
Now beating the market over the long-term is extremely hard, but beating the market every year is impossible. Not even Warren Buffett has done that – he has lagged the index plenty of times. The odd losing year is the minimum price of trying to beat the market.
Of course the fund management industry encourages us to believe otherwise – provided we invest with their people who work harder, smarter, later, or more photogenically. So no tears for the industry. But it does explain closet indexing to a large degree.
Fund management companies have little incentive to risk failure. For massive firms it makes much more sense to try to keep investors broadly content in order to collect those hefty fees, than it does to try to shoot the lights out and risk an exodus of money if you fail.
Career risk is another reason for closet indexing. Even if a fund provider wants its managers to really try to beat the index, it will probably fire someone who lags the market by 5% quicker than someone who lags it by 2%, let alone a manager who delivers 1% either side for a few years. If you’re a well-paid fund manager, wouldn’t you play safe?
The rise of computers and modelling has made it simple to determine variables such as tracking error. This data may be used by sophisticated investment committees and trustees to determine where their money goes. A fund naturally wants its numbers to look good.
Finally, active managers aren’t stupid. On the contrary, they are smart. They have read the same stuff you and I have read about the difficulty of beating the market, and while they may have some behavioural quirks that allow them to feel they’re special, they’re not utterly deluded.
The fear that they are being asked to do the impossible must gnaw away at fund managers sometimes.
Do they really dare shun HSBC, when it makes up nearly 10% of the index? Do they dare ditch BP, or GlaxoSmithKline? Look at all the controversy Neil Woodford has gotten into for refusing to hold oil companies in his much-lauded income fund – and he’s a deity among UK investors.
Can you imagine a 28-year old fund manager in a big institution who is managing a large cap UK fund being able to justify an eclectic pick-and-mix approach to the FTSE 350? Maybe avoiding all banks and oil companies, but going heavy on smaller industrial firms? And justifying it not just to her own boss, but to repeated rounds of big investors?
They’ll say it can happen, but the evidence suggests otherwise.
Don’t be a clone drone
The bottom line is if you want a shot at returns from funds that are sustainably different from the index, you will need to dig deeper into each fund’s holdings to see what it’s invested in.
In an ideal world, funds would clearly publish their active share in the fund literature, so you could identify a closet indexer at a glance. But for now you’ll need to check with sites like Morningstar, or else work it out for yourself.
Of course the bottom BOTTOM line is you shouldn’t go down this road at all. Investing passively into tracker funds is simpler, cheaper, and more likely to deliver better returns over the long-term.
- See H K.J. Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto of the Yale School of Management’s working paper: How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance. [↩]
Ironically the surviving founder of SCM Allan Miller was one of those 28 year old fund managers picking stocks at now defunct New Star before he “left for personal reasons”
So you might equally ask if he is sound person to park your money with?
My favourite fund manager story has to be Elizabeth (nee Peter) Young, the (wo)man single handedly responsible for extinguishing the house of Morgan Grenfell from the city in 1996 : http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/peter-young-rogue-trader.asp
Unfortunately this all only came to light after he was handed a £1bn of retail unit trust funds to play with…
What a scam – must be the next mis-selling scandal, and yet another nail in the coffin of all these “active manager” scam artists, who bill their gormless clients 2% etc which they get regardless of whether their genius pays off or not.
On a related subject, I’d welcome a Monevator commentary on smart beta index trackers. The concept performs well in independent tests (eg the recent Cass Business School reports), but (surprise surprise) there are some con artists out there, touting “fundamentals-weighted” trackers that aren’t.
Cheers – and thanks for the fascinating articles.
“the UK is amok …”: I suspect you mean ‘awash’.
No, I meant amok. I’m a frustrated poet. 🙂
1. As you say, the issue of “closet” index-trackers isn’t really news.
2. But I still find shocking the woefully inadequate transparency of actively managed funds in the UK. Disclosure for some managers is only a list of fund top ten holdings – but without percent weights. Because the holdings are not numbered, it’s unclear whether the top ten is in rank order. The top ten is historical: a point-in-time snapshot from the past. The remaining holdings are hidden; as is the number of holdings. This is the standard presentation of holdings for actively managed funds.
3. Meanwhile, the holdings of passively managed funds are fully transparent: most ETFs, for example, publish all their holdings, with percent weights, each day.
4. The real-time disclosure of all holdings is a strong argument itself for investing passively. This argument doesn’t always get the attention it deserves.
Most people are pretty clueless about the whole thing, as was I until a couple of years ago. One of my colleagues was telling me recently about a Virgin fund that had paid over 10% “interest” over the last year. Turns out it was a Virgin FTSE Tracker with a 1% annual fee. Such a product wouldn’t even exist if people understood what they were buying.
Part of the reason fund managers don’t disclose their holdings in real time is because they don’t want their competitors to know what they’re holding/buying/selling. Apparently. This is no excuse in my opinion as they should be taking their own decisions anyway. That is what their investors are paying them for isn’t it?!
Dare you name and shame the funds?
@Chris — Hi, if you click through to the PDF they have a full list in there.
Very interesting. I saw the original Yale research several years ago, but it is interesting to see that it holds good in the UK too.
Here’s the counterview, which has some good points:
I note that in the SCM research, the fund with the highest active share is Unicorn UK Income. That fund has active share of 99.5%, measured against the FTSE All Share.
But what does that mean? At first I thought it meant they just don’t hold any FTSE All Share shares. I think that would be one way to get an active share of 99.5%. But a quick look at their top 10 holdings shows companies in the FTSE250.
So, I guess the 99.5% means they are, on average, double overweight in about half the index constituents and have little or no holding of the other half. Perhaps this is in part attributable to being an income fund, so they are are naturally shunning low-yield stocks. If you shun half the index for this reason, then you are naturally going to be way “overweight” on the rest.
Looked at like that, it shows just how important it is to calculate active share using an appropriate index. SCM should have used a high yield version of the FTSE All Share for this fund.
Also, the Unicorn fund focuses on small cap stocks, so it doesn’t have big holdings of the high yielders at the top of the FTSE 100, such as the likes of Shell, HSBC. So, if you are eschewing most of the FTSE 100, which I think represents about 80% of the market cap of the FTSE All Share, then it would be impossible not to have a high active share compared with the FTSE All Share.
So, at least for this fund, SCM’s analysis is completely misleading. Perhaps the manager of Unicorn really is an idiosyncratic stock picker who is taking big risks, but without comparing with a relevant index (eg, high yield FTSE 250), SCM’s figures tell us nothing.
The Fidelity analysis seems to be making a similar point. I think what they are saying is that the apparent correlation between higher active share and higher returns is, at least in part, because these two factors are both correlated with being overweight in small cap stocks.
Small cap stocks have outperformed large cap over the last 15 years, so being overweight in small cap will tend to have given “outperformance”. It will also necessarily give a high active share. But sooner or later small cap will have a long phase of underperforming large cap. At that time, will the apparent average outperfomance associated with high active share disappear?
By the way, I’m not disagreeing that everyone should steer clear of the closet trackers. Funds with low active share can’t possibly deliver significant outperformance, so why pay an extra 0.5% or more of AMC for this? I don’t know where the right cut off lies, but I note that, compared with the FTSE All Share, several funds with active share of less than 60% have outperformed by an average of more than 5% per year over 5 years. Clearly these are not closet trackers.
The posts above relate to me wondering whether active share could help me choose the active funds that give me the best chance of outperformance for the part of my portfolio that doesn’t go into overt trackers. I think at best active share is just a way of selecting funds for further investigation, to understand whether the high active share signifies true conviction stock picking or just a poor match between the true investment criteria of the fund and the index with which they have been compared.